29Apr2026
Latest News & Report / Vietnam Briefing
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The early months of 2026 have acted as a regional stress test for Southeast Asia. A sharp escalation in Middle Eastern tensions, resulting in the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, has disrupted the flow of approximately 80% of the region’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil imports.1 This “oil shock” has not merely inflated fuel prices; it has exposed the structural fragility of economies tethered to global fossil fuel markets.3
While the crisis is regional, the response is increasingly fragmented. Transition pathways differ significantly across member states: some have doubled down on protectionist subsidies, while others, most notably through the Vietnam green transition, have accelerated a pivot toward domestically generated renewable energy as a tool for national economic survival.
Exposure to oil price volatility: Importers vs. Exporters
The shock divides Southeast Asia along a fault line: net oil position. Importers, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore, face immediate stagflationary pressure as energy costs ripple through logistics and supply chains. The Philippines (90% Gulf-dependent) declared a national energy emergency in March 2026; Thailand capped diesel prices; Singapore revised its 2026 inflation forecast upward despite holding 200+ days of strategic reserves[1].
Exporters Indonesia and Malaysia have seen a revenue boost, but it is fast being eroded. Indonesia set its entire US$22.5 billion fuel subsidy budget at US$70/barrel; with Brent (serving as the primary benchmark for oil prices worldwide) near US$104[2], the fiscal gap is widening and weighing on the rupiah. Malaysia is better cushioned — recent fiscal reforms allow it to sustain its BUDI95 subsidy — but is not immune, as it re-imports heavy crude for domestic refining and remains exposed to benchmark price swings.
Table 1: Country-level oil shock vulnerability — Southeast Asia
*Note: PH: Philippines, VN: Vietnam, TH: Thailand, SG: Singapore, ID: Indonesia, MY: Malaysia
| Metric | Net importers — PH, VN, TH, SG | Net exporters — ID, MY |
| Trade position | Dependent on imported crude and/or refined products | Net hydrocarbon exporters; partly offset by domestic subsidy obligations |
| Middle East crude dependence[3] | • VN: ~85%
• SG: ~77% • TH: ~70% • PH: ~52% |
• ID: ~35% of crude from Gulf (subsidies still raise subsidy cost)
• MY: ~25% (re-imports heavy Gulf crude to blend with domestic supply) |
| Strategic reserves[4] | • SG: 200+ days
• TH & PH: 40~60 days • VN: ~65 days |
• MY: ~60 days
• ID: ~20–30 days |
| Primary risk | Cost-push inflation & currency pressure:
• IMF projects Southeast Asian inflation rising to 2.6% in 2026[5]; • Each US$15/barrel Brent rise widens PH current account by ~0.7% of GDP[6] |
Fiscal deficit expansion via subsidy obligations:
• ID set subsidy budget at US$70/barrel; Brent now ~US$104/barrel2 |
| Energy mix vulnerability | High LNG/Brent spot sensitivity:
• VN’s Nghi Son locked to Kuwaiti crude feedstock[7]; • TH reliant on Gulf gas for power[8] |
• ID: Heavy reliance on coal and domestic palm oil;
• MY: blended crude model (exports light sweet crude and imports heavy crude) reduces vulnerability, but subsidy costs are still affected |
| Shock transmission | Retail price hikes & logistics surcharges[9]:
• PH: national energy emergency; • VN: domestic flight cancellations; • TH: key petrochemical plant shutdowns |
National credit & currency pressure:
• ID’s currency weakening; real rate differential vs. USD narrowing; 6 • MY credit outlook is stable thanks to a diversified revenue structure (benefiting from gas exports when energy prices rise) |
| Policy response[10] | • VN: 0% petroleum tariff (Apr–Jun 2026)[11] ; work-from-home encouragement
• PH: excise cuts, Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) emergency imports, 4-day work week • TH: diesel price cap, work-from-home mandate • SG: Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) tightening; fiscal reserves deployed |
• ID: fuel subsidies maintained; remote working adopted
• MY: BUDI95 subsidy sustained; “adequate fiscal room” through mid-2026 |
B&Company’s synthesis

